

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Complexity in Coalition Operations: The Campaign of the Sixth Coalition Against Napoleon

by

Kenneth A Turner
US Army

Dr. J. B. Bartholomees
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Complexity in Coalition Operations The Campaign of the Sixth Coalition Against Napoleon Unclassified				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Turner, Kenneth ; Author				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Carlisle, PA17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE ,					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 38	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Rife, Dave RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil	
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified		19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number DSN	
				Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18	

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Kenneth A Turner
TITLE: The Complexity of Coalition Operations: The Campaign of the Sixth Coalition Against Napoleon
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 07 April 2003 PAGES: 38 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Campaign of the Sixth Coalition, from the Summer of 1813 until the abdication of Napoleon in April 1814, offers some important and valid insights into the successful execution of coalition warfare while serving to illustrate the complexities of coalition warfare. As the United States continues to rely on the use of coalitions as a major component of our National Strategy when committing military forces, it is incumbent on senior leaders to understand the complexities of coalition warfare. This campaign offers that opportunity. The major turning point in the Campaign occurred in the Summer of 1813 with the addition of Austria to the Allied Coalition. Many writers cite this campaign as an example of how to conduct coalition warfare. These works routinely focus on the aspects of unity of command, the coalition's strategic objective and the execution of that objective. While these aspects are important, the campaign also provides an example of the importance of a dominant partner in a coalition, capable of providing the military resources, as well as the strategic leadership to ensure the successful pursuit of the end state envisioned by the coalition. This study will illustrate that this dominant partner was the Austrian Empire, personified by Prince Metternich at the strategic level and Field Marshal Schwarzenburg at the operational level. These two leaders effectively ensured unity of effort of a coalition wrought with a dysfunctional command structure, coupled with disparate National Objectives, to obtain the initial overthrow of Napoleon.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	vii
COMPLEXITY IN COALITION OPERATIONS: THE CAMPAIGN OF THE SIXTH COALITION AGAINST NAPOLEON.....	1
IMPORTANCE OF COALITION WARFARE IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY.....	1
STRATEGIC SITUATION 1813.....	3
FRENCH DISPOSITIONS	4
ALLIED DISPOSITIONS	6
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813.....	8
THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN.....	8
THE SUMMER ARMISTICE	11
THE ACCOUNTING	22
ENDNOTES.....	25
BIBLIOGRAPHY	29

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1.....	5
FIGURE 2.....	6
FIGURE 3.....	13
FIGURE 4.....	15
FIGURE 5.....	19

COMPLEXITY IN COALITION OPERATIONS: THE CAMPAIGN OF THE SIXTH COALITION AGAINST NAPOLEON

The Campaign of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon, from the summer of 1813 to the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813, offers invaluable insights into the successful conduct of coalition warfare and provides an exceptional example of the complexities inherent in coalition operations. As the United States continues to rely on the use of coalitions as a major component of our national strategy when committing military forces, it is important for military leaders to understand these complexities as well as how to successfully work within a coalition.

Authors often cite this campaign as an example of how to wage coalition warfare. Many of these published works focus on the aspects of unity of command, strategic purpose, and execution of the strategic plan.¹ While these aspects are important, the campaign also provides an example of the importance of a lead nation in the coalition, capable of providing the major military forces, as well as the strategic leadership, to ensure the successful pursuit of the end state of the coalition partners. This study contends that in 1813 this lead nation was the Empire of Austria, personified by Prince Clemens W. L. Von Metternich at the strategic level and Field Marshal Schwarzenberg at the operational level. These leaders effectively ensured unity of effort of a coalition plagued by an often dysfunctional command structure and disparate national interests to achieve the initial overthrow of Napoleon. Metternich laid the diplomatic groundwork at the strategic level to ensure Austrian resources were available to assure success in attaining Austria's strategic objectives. Prince Schwarzenberg persevered at the tactical and operational levels to ensure successful coalition operations and to keep the coalition focused on the overall objective at the strategic level. He achieved this despite interference from the monarchs of three great powers and the often-begrudging cooperation of the Prussian and Russian generals. These leaders' activities during this campaign serve as models for US leaders when confronted with the challenges of coalition warfare.

IMPORTANCE OF COALITION WARFARE IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

What does the study of a 19th Century coalition provide for leaders confronted with 21st Century challenges? Coalition warfare is often complex, characterized by contrasting national objectives and complicated command structures. The friction between achieving unity of command versus meeting conflicting nation's interests contributes to a constant tension that works to tear a coalition apart. Because of this constant tension, there is an overriding necessity to build consensus to keep the coalition functioning. Furthermore, slowness of execution, suppression of national objectives to meet coalition objectives, and hidden national

agendas, all contribute to the complexity. Successful coalitions require a leadership style that combines persuasion, strategic vision, and unerring focus on the coalition's goal. This campaign of the 19th century is a superb illustration of this complexity, as well as an example of a successful coalition that deserves study for applicable lessons for the 21st century.

The United States National Security Strategy, as well as Department of Defense doctrine, acknowledges that in the future the United States will often rely on coalitions to commit military forces. In the modern international political environment coalitions help provide legitimacy to US policy objectives. Additionally, the 2002 National Security Strategy consistently highlights the importance of working within coalitions as well as international agreements to address regional security concerns that support national interests.² Throughout the Twentieth Century, when US forces were involved in major operations, it was as part of a coalition—normally as the leader. Joint Doctrine specifically directs commanders to actively seek to conduct multilateral operations whenever possible.³ In all likelihood senior, US military commanders will be forced to operate in the complex world of coalition warfare. While coalition warfare is complex, Joint Doctrine, Defense publications, and Army field manuals do address relevant tenets to guide leaders in conducting coalition warfare.

Joint Publication 3-16, Fundamentals of Multi-National Operations, details four tenets for conducting successful coalition operations. The American experience in World War II, where General Dwight D. Eisenhower felt the primary requirement for success for a coalition was “mutual confidence” strongly influenced the development of these tenets. The joint doctrine goes on to advise that to aid in establishing this confidence certain tenets are critical. This advice includes treating each coalition partner with respect, developing a professional rapport, developing knowledge of each coalition partner's strength and what they can contribute to success, and having patience in achieving results.⁴ While these tenets may be important, they are primarily guidelines on how to cooperate and get along with peers. These are valuable aspects of building coalitions, but hardly sufficient to provide principles to help ensure success. A successful coalition must have unity of effort, a strategic purpose, and a mechanism or drive to ensure the coalition remains focused on the strategic objective.

A review of successful coalitions throughout history, as well as a large body of theoretical work, also reveals that successful coalitions share the common characteristics of unity of effort, a strong strategic purpose that unites the coalition, and a sense of drive that ensures the coalition maintains its focus on the strategic objective. In studying the operations of the Sixth Coalition, Austria played the prominent role in the success of the Allies. Austria's leadership ensured unity of effort and provided the decisive resources to ensure the Allies stayed focused

on the strategic objective, i.e., the defeat of Napoleon and the threat he posed to other European powers. The leaders achieved this through perseverance, the development of a feasible plan, and adherence to the plan.

Before examining Austria's role in the success of the Sixth Coalition, one needs to understand the relative failures of the coalition prior to Austria's formal entry into the operations. The Coalition did not exercise unity of command or possess a sound operational plan until the integration of Austria into the operations. Additionally, the coalition failed to maintain unity of purpose in its operations. These elements contributed to the Coalition's failure and were evident at the tactical, as well as operational, level from the spring of 1813 until the fall of the same year. Interference from Czar Alexander of Russia, and to a lesser extent Frederick William of Prussia, prevented the Allied command structure from effectively executing the campaign. At both the battles of Bautzen and Lutzen, as well as the maneuvering before and after each battle, the monarchs overruled the nominal military commander. This interference effectively reduced coalition effectiveness and contributed to the allied defeat in both battles. The operations of the initial stages of the campaign clearly demonstrate this problem. However, after Austria formally joined the Coalition, the leadership of Prince Karl Von Schwarzenberg as military commander significantly solved the unity of effort issue and was one of the critical factors in deciding the campaign in the Allies' favor. While the interference by the Allied monarchs continued after Schwarzenberg's appointment, the Austrian general was able to persevere and, much like General Eisenhower in World War II, use his tact and guile to achieve enough unity of effort to ensure coalition success. United States military leaders can learn much from the complexities Schwarzenberg faced to help prepare them for future coalition operations.

STRATEGIC SITUATION 1813

The genesis of the Sixth Coalition⁵ was in June 1812 as the French Army crossed over the Neimen River to invade the Russian Empire. At that time, only Russia, Spain, Portugal and Great Britain were formally at war with France. With the destruction of Napoleon's main army and subsequent retreat in 1812, the coalition grew as reluctant former French allies changed sides. Prussia was the first to leave. Prussia, who was an unwilling ally of Napoleon during 1812, signed the Convention of Kalisch on 28 February 1813 formally joining Russia in the Sixth Coalition.⁶ In addition, the minor states of the Confederation of the Rhine continued to abandon Napoleon's cause throughout the end of 1812 and the beginning of 1813.⁷ Despite the continued growth during the spring of 1813, the Coalition demonstrated throughout the spring

campaign that it was incapable of defeating Napoleon quickly and decisively. It was not until Austria joined the coalition that the Allies had the resources and leadership required to succeed.

FRENCH DISPOSITIONS

By the spring of 1813, Napoleon had reconstituted his army and was once again in position in central Europe to regain his lost territory and prestige. In April the French Army, designated the Army of the Main, consisted of approximately 200,000 men, and was located in the Jena, Erfurt, Gotha area, east of Leipzig. The main body under Napoleon consisted of four corps, two cavalry corps, and the Imperial Guard. Marshal Michael Ney commanded the III corps of 45,000 men; Marshal Marmont with VI corps of 25,000, General Bertrand led IV Corps of 30,000 and Marshal Oudinot with 25,000 men in XII corps. Marshal Bessieres commanded the Guard consisting of 15,000 soldiers.⁸ North of the Army of the Main, Napoleon's son-in-law, Prince Eugene, still commanded the remnants of the forces from the retreat from Russia, the four corps of 60,000 men strung out west of the Elbe. Napoleon's plan, originally related to Prince Eugene in March of 1813, called for an army of 300,000, to conduct an offensive along the line of the Elbe River.⁹ However, in April, with only 200,000 men available in the area of operations, Napoleon had to modify his plan. He expected to cross the Elbe at Havelberg, move through Stettin and eventually relieve the siege of Danzig.¹⁰ (See figure 1.) Napoleon was focusing his plan on geographic locations and not the allied armies in the area of operations.




FIGURE 1

ALLIED DISPOSITIONS

On 25 April 1813, the Allies had deployed their main army of 101,000 under Marshal Kutusov along the left bank of the Elbe River, southwest of Berlin, in a line from Magdeburg in the northwest to Dresden in the southeast. General Ludwig Wittgenstein commanded the left wing of 39,000 men composed of Prussian General Bulow (17,000) in and around Roslau and Prussian General York and Russian General Berg (22,000) in and around Landsburg. Blucher commanded the center of the Allied forces composed of his corps of 23,000 Prussians and




FIGURE 2

10,000 Russians under Winzengrode west of Leipzig. South of Blucher, General Miloradovich occupied Chermitz with 11,000 Russians, with General Tormassov in Dresden with the Russian Guard of 18,000. (See Figure 2.)¹¹

On 28 April, the commander of the allied forces, General Kutosov unexpectedly died at Kalisch from a long-term illness. General Wittgenstein officially replaced him as "Commander in Chief of the Army of the Combined Allied Powers" on 25 April but word did not reach him until 27 April.¹² In reality, he did not have the authority, experience, or the organizational structure in place to exercise effective control of the entire combined operations of the Sixth Coalition. General Wittgenstein did not have the appropriate military authority to control operations. He only commanded his army, Blucher's and General Winzengrode's forces. General Wittgenstein did not have any authority over the two Russian forces of Generals Tormassov and Miloradovich that were still east of the Elbe. The Czar maintained control of these forces and at times issued orders to the two generals without Wittgenstein's knowledge.¹³ Additionally, as Wittgenstein attempted to concentrate the allied forces Czar Alexander refused to relinquish control of Russian forces east of the river or move them west of the Elbe.¹⁴

In addition to not having operational control of the forces in the area, General Wittgenstein did not have an operational plan to defeat Napoleon. Infighting, bickering, and petty arguments plagued Allied headquarters as General Wittgenstein attempted to develop his plan. The point of argument was the location of the assembly area for the main allied force in response to Napoleon's advance. The competing concentration areas were Altenburg, south of Leipzig and west of Dresden, or the vicinity of Leipzig. Generals Blucher and York advised Wittgenstein that with the arrival of Napoleon in the area that the Allies could still risk confronting the main French Army. They based this advice on the immense advantage the Allies enjoyed in the cavalry arm and advised a concentration between Leipzig and Wurzen.¹⁵ This concentration would allow Wittgenstein to defend Berlin and at the same time maneuver to the south if Napoleon threatened the allied left or southern flank. General Scharnhorst disagreed with this concentration. He believed that the army should concentrate east of Leipzig and move to counter Napoleon's moves if he advanced to threaten the allies left flank. On the other hand, Clausewitz advocated defending even further south behind the Elbe. Wittgenstein's Chief of Staff, General Toll, advised Wittgenstein to concentrate the Allies around Altenburg. General Toll believed that Napoleon intended to separate Blucher from Wittgenstein by advancing between Leipzig and Altenburg.

After much consultation, Wittgenstein issued the following instructions in an attempt to respond to Napoleon's crossing of the Salle River, "I desire to assemble all available troops at

Leipzig, so that, in union with the forces of Generals Blucher and Winzingrode, I may, if the enemy assumes the offensive by Weissenfels, offer battle at Lutzen.”¹⁶ When Czar Alexander heard of Wittgenstein’s instructions for the concentration, he objected and sent General Wolkonski to General Wittgenstein’s Headquarters to change the orders.¹⁷ Alexander reasoned that the initial plan was too hazardous. He believed that if Napoleon defeated the allied army in Wittgenstein’s concentration area, it would force the army to retreat to the Elbe River near Torgau. Because of the Czar’s intervention, the Allies began their concentration as the Czar directed, south of Napoleon’s main avenue of approach.

The presence of the Czar Alexander of Russia and Frederick William of Prussia handicapped Wittgenstein’s ability to exercise effective control. Wittgenstein was routinely “second guessed” and overruled by the monarchs’ presence at coalition headquarters. While commanders must operate within the guidance and parameters of strategic political controls, this situation clearly violated unity of command. This dysfunctional command situation adversely affected coalition operations throughout the spring campaign.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813

THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN

On 1 May 1813, Napoleon advanced across the Saale River intent on moving through Leipzig to the east and eventually through Dresden.¹⁸ Unknown to Napoleon, the Allied army of Wittgenstein with 75,000 men was southwest of his line of march arrayed near Zwenkau, with 18,000 Russians farther east.¹⁹ The allied presence soon made itself felt.

Unable to ignore the threat to his right flank, Napoleon maneuvered and engaged the Allies at Lutzen. On 2 May, the two armies met in a meeting engagement. By the evening, the French forces on the field totaled 110,000 against the Allied army of 80,000. After fighting throughout the day, the Allies were in full retreat by 1900. Allied casualties were up to 20,000 while the French also lost about 20,000, but Napoleon clearly held the field and the initiative.²⁰ Napoleon had once again outmaneuvered the Allies. Caught at a disadvantage because of faulty reconnaissance due to his cavalry shortage, Napoleon quickly adjusted his tactical plan and brought more forces to the decisive field of battle before the Allies could bring their numbers to bear. The shortage of French cavalry also prevented Napoleon from mounting a decisive pursuit; nevertheless, he possessed the initiative and moved quickly to retain it. He had won the first major engagement after the disaster of Russia, and his prestige and reputation was again on the rise.

During the Allied retreat the uncertainty caused by a lack of a comprehensive operational plan emerged again. There was no guiding vision to link tactical or operational moves to achieve the strategic coalition objective of deposing Napoleon. As a result, the Allies disagreed about where the army should move in order to position itself to renew the fight. The Prussians were concerned about their capital to the north, while the Russian's line of communication ran to the east.²¹ Each coalition partner allowed national interests to govern the movement of its forces instead of focusing on the strategic objective of defeating Napoleon. After much disagreement, the Allies decided that both considerations were important. As a result, Bulow's element of 30,000 Prussians screened Berlin while the majority of the allied army of 100,000 men retreated to take up a position around Bautzen, east of Dresden.²²

As the Allies retreated to Bautzen, Napoleon used the time to reorganize his army into two wings. He sent Prince Eugene to Italy to organize the region in a political countermove against Austrian intentions. Napoleon understood well that Austria was considering whether she should openly join the Sixth Coalition. He hoped that a stronger French presence in the Kingdom of Italy would influence Austria to remain neutral. To replace Eugene, he placed Ney in charge of one wing and maintained direct control of the main army. Ney's force consisted of 79,500 infantry and 4,800 cavalry. The main army, under Napoleon's direct control, consisted of 110,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry.²³

When the Allies arrived in the area around Bautzen, they began fortifying their position and attempting to discern Napoleon's next move.²⁴ Additionally, as the Allies moved further east they shortened their line of communications to their resources and advancing reinforcements, and subsequently added the 13,000 Russians of General Barclay De Tolly's Corps to the allied army.²⁵

Napoleon arrived before Bautzen on 19 May and spent the day reconnoitering the strong Allied defenses and moving his army into position. The French army consisted of 115,000 men under Napoleon and 85,000 men under Ney to the north.²⁶ The allied army consisted of 96,200 combatants.²⁷ Once again, Napoleon had outmaneuvered the allied army by bringing more forces to the battlefield at the critical location to decide the campaign. Napoleon's intent was to pin the Allied army in place with a frontal attack using his main force, while Ney enveloped the allied right with his 85,000 men. The Allies planned to defend their strong, fortified position. Once the Allies made this decision, the next critical decision was where to weight the main effort of the defense. It was in this area that the dysfunctional chain of command adversely affected the Sixth Coalition's effort. The "Commander in Chief of the Army of the Combined Allied Powers", General Wittgenstein, properly guessed that Napoleon would attack the Allied army

from the north, thus forcing it to retreat toward the territory of the still neutral Austria. This in fact is what Napoleon had in mind with his maneuver from the north. He wanted to push the Allies into Austrian territory, thereby forcing the Austrians either to disarm the Allied army or to abandon their neutrality so he would know where they stood politically. At the same time, he would be in a position to threaten the Austrian capital of Vienna, which would provide him leverage to influence the Austrian decision.²⁸

Czar Alexander had a different opinion of Napoleon's intentions. The Czar believed that the French would try to separate the Allied army from Austrian support by attacking the allied southern flank. As a result, he overruled General Wittengstein and directed the repositioning of forces from the right flank and the center to reinforce the left flank.²⁹ This interference contributed to the allied defeat later in the battle and is another example of the dysfunctional command arrangement in the Sixth Coalition.

Napoleon began the pinning attack of the allied position on 20 May and made progress throughout the day. By 1800, the French had driven the Allies through the town of Bautzen. The next day the French continued the attack along the front expecting Ney with his 75,000 men to envelop the allied northern flank cutting off their retreat, or forcing them to the south. However, Ney was unable to close the trap. The Allies escaped but with a loss of 20,000 combatants. Once again, Napoleon was not able to aggressively pursue the defeated army due to his shortage of cavalry.³⁰ Much like Lutzen, the battle of Bautzen was a French victory illustrating the French tactical prowess without accomplishing the decisive results Napoleon needed. More importantly, it showed that the Allies were still unable to defeat Napoleon without a significant resource advantage.

In defeat once again, the tensions of national interests threatened the unity of the Sixth Coalition. The Prussian generals wanted to retreat to a position to better defend Prussia and Berlin. Conversely, the Russian generals wanted to retreat into Poland.³¹ The disagreements over the proper operational move once again resulted in the intervention of Czar Alexander. This was the final insult to General Wittgenstein. He resigned his position as commander, and Russian General Barclay de Tolley assumed responsibility of the Allied armies. Wittgenstein's resignation was due to Alexander's constant interference at both Bautzen and during the retreat. Soon after his appointment as Allied commander, Barclay de Tolley argued with Blucher over the proper route of retreat and, once again, the Czar intervened. The army retired to Silesia where it could maintain contact with the still neutral Austria and maintain the façade of protecting Prussia.³²

The Sixth Coalition had lost another major battle against Napoleon. Napoleon accomplished this with local superiority of forces at the critical time on the battlefield and demonstrated once again that he was tactically and operationally superior to any individual commander in the coalition. The sustained bickering, arguments, and disagreements at Allied Headquarters continued to hinder effective Allied operations. Until it could bring overwhelming resources to bear at the strategic and operational levels, the coalition was at risk of losing any future confrontation. Furthermore, the coalition needed a sound plan to translate the strategic objective of defeating Napoleon to operational success.

THE SUMMER ARMISTICE

After six weeks of maneuvering and numerous battles across central Europe, both the Allies and the French were exhausted. Both sides were ready for a respite and signed an armistice 2 June, which the antagonists extended until 20 July and once again until 10 August 1813.³³

The diplomatic outcome of the armistice was the most important result of the pause and significantly altered the balance of power in Central Europe. Austria joined the Sixth Coalition and provided the coalition with the overwhelming resources needed to defeat Napoleon. However, the real activities occurred while the armed hostilities were still taking place. Prior to the armistice, the diplomatic maneuvering resulted in the Treaty of Reichenbach, which Metternich signed on 14 June 1813. By the conditions of the treaty, Austria agreed to present a set of terms to Napoleon, and more importantly, to undertake armed action against Napoleon in the event that he refused the terms.³⁴ Metternich presented the conditions to Napoleon, and after much debate and counter proposals, the Allies and Napoleon could not agree to terms. This resulted in Austria joining the armed conflict against Napoleon on 12 August 1813, although the Austrians did not have a formal alliance with either Prussia or Russia. Metternich wanted to maintain Austria's flexibility to eventually mediate the conflict and not completely isolate Austria from France.³⁵

At the conclusion of the armistice in August 1813, the Allies were numerically superior to the French throughout the theater. With the addition of Austria and Sweden, the Allied army consisted of 570,000 effectives. Napoleon had used the time to replenish his losses from the spring campaign and mustered 442,000 soldiers.³⁶ The ultimate strength of the coalition lay in its reserves. The Allies could call on an additional 500,000 soldiers while Napoleon had virtually drained France's manpower pool in his effort to replenish his armies after 1812 and 1813.³⁷ The Allies finally had strategic numerical superiority. Additionally, the loyalty of many of Napoleon's

Confederation of the Rhine allies was suspect. With this numerical superiority, the Allies still needed to develop and execute a sound operational plan.

The Trachenburg Plan was one of the most important aspects of the Allies' eventual victory over Napoleon. (See figure 3 for the complete text.) The credit for the development of the plan rests primarily with the Austrians. This plan embodied the strategic concept Austria intended to pursue to achieve its objectives. However, much of the work to develop the plan began prior to Austria formally joining the coalition. On 31 May 1813, the Austrian General Schwarzenburg and his chief of staff, General Radetzky, met with the dying Prussian General Von Scharnhorst in Prague. At this meeting they developed the operational concept that the Allies used to obtain the Sixth Coalition's objectives. The plan laid out the following principles. The largest Allied army, which became the Army of Bohemia under Schwarzenberg, must concentrate against the enemy's main force but only engage that force if it enjoyed a great advantage. The forces on the flanks and the rear of the French must move to cut off the enemy line of communication if Napoleon advanced toward one of the other allied armies.³⁸

Many writers mistakenly characterize the Trachenburg Plan as an avoidance of direct conflict with Napoleon while concentrating on defeating his subordinates.³⁹ This is really an over-simplification of the strategy. While there was an implication in the plan to avoid direct conflict with any army directly under Napoleon, it was actually a plan more characteristic of attrition warfare. Attrition was the essence for the plan and was appropriate considering the resources Austria brought to the fight. General Radetzky summed up the strategy when he said, "Battle with a superior enemy army should be avoided until the other allied armies have united with us. Avoid the ultimate confrontation until success can be assured."⁴⁰ With the advantage of unity of command that Napoleon enjoyed over the Coalition, coupled with his superior generalship, executing attrition warfare was the only real hope the Allies had to defeat the French.

Another important facet that Austria contributed to the coalition was in unity of command. The Allies demonstrated repeatedly that their command system was dysfunctional and plagued with interference from the monarchs that accompanied the army. Czar Alexander's interference at Bautzen ensured the ally's defeat and his involvement in overruling General Wittgenstein resulted in the latter's resignation. On the other hand, Napoleon did not suffer from this problem. He had unity of both political and military command centralized in his person. The Allies needed one leader who would be responsible for decisions and who was experienced enough to garner the respect of the other generals and the monarchs. As far as Metternich and the Austrians were concerned, this one person was Field Marshal Schwarzenburg. Metternich

Trachenberg Convention

Convention signed at Trachenberg, 12th of July, 1813, as a basis for the Operations of the Campaign.

The following general principles have been decided: the Allied forces will always cut as direct as possible the enemy forces. As a consequence:

1. The corps which have to conduct operations on the enemy flanks or rear will always cut as direct as possible the enemy line of operations.
2. The larger Allied force must select a position which enables it to face the enemy wherever he advances. The salient of Bohemia seems to be proper to enable it. According to this principle, the combined armies will have to occupy the following positions before the end of armistice:

A part of the Allied army in Silesia (98,000 to 100,000) will join as soon as possible, by the routes between Landshut and Gratz, the Austrian Army in order to form with it a 200,000 to 220,000 strength force in Bohemia.

The Army of the Crown Prince of Sweden, while leaving a 15,000 to 20,000 strength Corps screening the Danish and French from Lubeck and Hamburg, will mass approximately 70,000 troops near Trauenbrutzen. As soon as the armistice comes to an end, this Army will cross the Elbe River between Torgau and Magdebourg, then moves toward Leipzig.

The rest of the Allied Army in Silesia, with 50,000 soldiers, will follow the enemy towards the Elbe River. This army will avoid committing itself except in the case of an extremely favorable situation. Once on the Elbe River, this force will try to cross the river between Torgau and Dresden in order to join the Crown Prince of Sweden's Army. The strength will be therefore 120,000 troops. If however, there is a need to reinforce the Allied Army in Bohemia, this Army, instead of joining the Swedish Army, will quickly move to Bohemia.

The Austrian part of the Allied force will advance either by Eger or by Hoff, or in Saxony, Silesia, or along the Danube.

If the Emperor NAPOLEON decides to march to fight the Bohemian Army, the Crown Prince of Sweden's Army will try as quick as possible to reach the enemy's rear. If, on the contrary, Napoleon moves toward the Swedish Army, the Allied Army will conduct a vigorous offensive operation through the enemy communications to join the battle. All the armies will make the enemy camp the point of rendezvous.

The Russian Army (Reserve) led by General Bennigsen will move from the Vistula River to the Oder River by Kalish in the direction of Glogau in order to be capable of moving towards the enemy if he stays in SILESIA, or denying him the ability to invade Poland.

*Translation of the Trachenberg Convention from the original French courtesy Major Jean Parlanti, Army of the Republic of France. Taken from LCDR John Trost Kuehn's Command and General Staff College paper The Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition Against Napoleon in 1813, 1997.

FIGURE 3

summed up the Austrian position in August: “the important thing is to have a decisive voice in the determination of the military dispositions, and to maintain against everyone--as I have been emphasizing to the Emperor Alexander--the principle that the power that puts 300,000 men into the field is the first power, and all others only auxiliaries.”⁴¹ Despite Prince Schwarzenberg's suitability for the command, his appointment was not without controversy. Czar Alexander of Russia initially rejected Schwarzenberg in favor of Austrian Archduke Charles, the brother of Emperor Francis. The Czar reasoned that Archduke Charles, as the first leader to beat Napoleon, was the logical choice. Additionally, Alexander believed that Antoine Jomini would be a good Chief of Staff for Charles.⁴² The Austrians won their point and appointed Schwarzenberg to lead the allied armies.

However, even after Schwarzenberg's appointment, there were still instances of disunity, as well as outright disobedience. He related an example of his frustration because of the problems of the many monarchs at his headquarters in a note he penned in September of 1813. “It is really inhuman what I have to tolerate and bear, surrounded as I am by weaklings, fools of all kinds, eccentric project-makers, intriguers, blockheads, gossips, fault-finders. More than once I have felt in danger of being overwhelmed.”⁴³ Despite this frustration, he persevered and remained focused on the end state of the coalition. Schwarzenberg understood that defeating Napoleon was the objective of the coalition and that any distraction was worth enduring as long as it did not hinder that endstate.

Prince Schwarzenberg was the best choice to act as overall commander of the Allied armies in the opinion of many. He was well suited because of his leadership style and his lack of political ambition. Metternich understood that there were many in the allied camp that did not fit that description, and he did not need the political ambitions of generals interfering in his activities. Gordon Craig in his Harmon series lecture to the Air Force College compared Marshal Schwarzenberg's leadership to General Dwight D. Eisenhower's.

The new supreme commander's talents were, to be sure, more diplomatic than strictly military, and it was probably a good thing that this was so. Like Dwight D. Eisenhower in another great coalition a hundred and thirty years later, his great gift was his ability, by patience and the arts of ingratiation, to hold together a military alliance, which before Napoleon was defeated comprised fourteen members, and to persuade quarrelling monarchs and their field commanders to give more than lip service to the alliance's strategical plan.⁴⁴




FIGURE 4

With the addition of Austria and the appointment of Field Marshal Schwarzenberg to command the coalition forces, the Sixth Coalition renewed its struggle against Napoleon. In August 1813, the Allied forces consisted of three major armies as envisioned in the Trachenberg Plan. Prince Schwarzenberg commanded the Army of Bohemia consisting of 230,000 men positioned north of Prague in Bohemia. The Prussian Marshal Blucher commanded the 95,000 Russo-Prussian Army of Silesia positioned 90 miles east of Schwarzenberg, near Breslau. Prince Bernadotte of Sweden, the former French Marshal, commanded the third Allied army, the Army of the North, consisting of 110,000 men positioned to defend Berlin.

During the armistice, Napoleon reorganized his army into two wings and maintained it in the salient in Saxony between the three Allied armies. Marshal Oudinot commanded the northern wing consisting of 72,000 men south of Berlin. Napoleon maintained control of the main force of 310,000 men facing the two southern armies occupying a line extending from Dresden in the west to approximately 30 miles North West of Breslau.⁴⁵ He planned to move on Berlin with his northern force and maintain the main army, with Dresden as his base of operations, in an operational defense awaiting the arrival of the main Allied force.⁴⁶

The Battle of Dresden provides an outstanding example of the problems inherent in the allied command structure with which Prince Schwarzenberg still had to cope. As part of the overall allied operational plan, Blucher began his advance from Silesia toward Leipzig. In reaction to this move, Napoleon advanced east from Dresden to engage Blucher's forces. As Napoleon advanced, Schwarzenberg moved from the south to attack Marshal St Cyr's 20,000 man Corps, which Napoleon had left at Dresden. Napoleon, unable to close with Blucher, due to the latter's withdrawal in accordance with the allied plan, began moving forces into the Dresden area once he determined St Cyr was facing the major portion of the allied force. On 25 August, Schwarzenberg's army had driven St Cyr's forces back from their outer defenses but he was still concentrating his army for a decisive attack. Napoleon arrived at Dresden in the morning of 26 August. Once the Allies learned of his arrival, disunity ensued and the bickering between the monarchs and their advisors commenced.⁴⁷ There is even much disagreement in many sources as to what each monarch proposed at the time. Allan Palmer in Metternich Councilor of Europe cites that the Czar Alexander insisted on continuing the attack against the advice of Emperor Francis of Austria⁴⁸. David Chandler in Campaigns of Napoleon, states that the Czar advocated breaking off the action and that King Frederick of Prussia advocated attacking. Regardless of what each monarch really wanted to do, the fact that the monarchs had a say in the tactical and operational situation illustrates Schwarzenberg's difficult position.

After listening to the dissenting views Schwarzenberg agreed to call off the attack, but it was too late. Schwarzenberg had issued orders for the attack earlier in the morning, and as the monarchs bickered, the cannonade to announce the attack commenced. The result of the frontal assault on a prepared position was a resounding defeat for the Allies. Allied losses were 38,000, while the French only lost about 10,000.⁴⁹

Dresden was another French victory that worked to redeem the prestige and military prowess of Napoleon and his “new” army. On the other hand, Allied fortunes at the battle illustrated the requirement to adhere to the Trachenburg Plan, something that the Allies did not do at Dresden. While the Allies did outnumber Napoleon, the numeric superiority was not large enough to offset the fortified positions inherent in the Dresden defenses. The plan called for attriting the French until the Allies gained overwhelming superiority combined with the forces on the flanks and rear cutting off the lines of communication. While the Allies were unable to execute the plan at Dresden, events along the “flanks and rear” of the main French Army proved the feasibility of the Trachenburg Plan.

During the later part of August, the Allies achieved a variety of important victories over smaller French forces that significantly altered the course of the entire campaign in their favor. On 23 August, Swedish Crown Prince Charles, the former French Marshal Bernadotte, defeated Marshal Oudinot at the battle of Gross Beren south of Berlin. As Napoleon closed on Dresden, he left Marshal Macdonald to continue the pursuit of Blucher’s Army of Silisia toward the east. On 26 August, Blucher turned on Macdonald and defeated him at Juar.⁵⁰ Additionally, on 30 August, General Vandamme attempted to cut off the allied retreat to the south from Dresden. In the resulting engagement at Kulm, the Allies totally isolated Vandamme’s Corps and destroyed it, capturing the General.⁵¹ The allied successes continued into the month of September. Crown Prince Charles defeated Marshal Ney, who had replaced Marshal Oudinot, on 6 September at the Battle of Denniwitz, as the French attempted another drive on Berlin.⁵²

Because of these victories over a short time period, the entire campaign shifted in the favor of the Allies both physically and mentally. Allied morale improved, while morale within the French ranks declined. General Von Gersdorf, a Saxon on the French staff, sums up the impact of these losses on the atmosphere at Napoleon’s Headquarters.

The impression made by the successes at Dresden and Moreau’s death have been wiped out; all consequences these events might have entailed are simply destroyed. Confidence grows in the camp of the Allies in proportion as it sinks with us. The Emperor is very quite; I hardly like to write ‘depressed’ but very pensive, curiously he is not irritable; the spirit of Headquarters generally bears the stamp of time.⁵³

In addition to the morale consequences of the defeat of the smaller French forces, there were operational effects. The Army of Bohemia escaped Napoleon's attempted encirclement. Furthermore, the Army of the North advanced from Berlin to the south and Blucher's Army of Silisia advanced from the east toward Dresden. Napoleon's tactical victory of Dresden became an operational failure due to the allied victories over elements on the flanks and rear of the main army. The Allies were reducing the operational area, restricting Napoleon's room to maneuver. The victories of the allies on the flanks and rear of Napoleon's main army proved the viability of the Trachenberg Plan.

During September the situation continued to favor the Allies. They operated on exterior lines while continuing to shrink the operational area around Napoleon, and added 60,000 Russian soldiers under General Bennigsen.⁵⁴ For the first time in the campaign, the Allies took the initiative and implemented an operational plan with the intention of directly confronting Napoleon personally to force a decisive battle. Schwarzenberg was maintaining the unity of effort in the campaign by directly focusing the coalition forces on defeating Napoleon in the classic "Napoleonic decisive battle". His plan called for the major portion of the Allied force to position itself west of Napoleon's main army, cutting off his lines of communication to France and compelling a battle.⁵⁵

During September, Schwarzenberg attempted to cross the Bohemian mountains and cut off Napoleon's communications to France, but Napoleon reacted to prevent this. Despite this setback in the south, the Allies were able to make progress in the east as Blucher pushed Macdonald's army to the west toward Dresden.⁵⁶ Napoleon still enjoyed interior lines from his base of operations at Dresden with the Allies to the north, south, and east; however, the Allies continued to tighten the noose around Napoleon's young army. At first glance, it appears that there was no progress in the later part of September. The Allies were still along exterior lines with Napoleon enjoying the operational interior lines—a perceived advantage for the French. However, the constant marching from one part of the operational area to another was having a debilitating effect on Napoleon and his army. The Trachenberg Plan was working despite Schwarzenberg's retreat to the south.

Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia was south of Dresden with 220,000 men. Blucher with 70,000 men was located near Bautzen and the Army of the North, consisting of 80,000 men, remained north of Wittenberg after its defeat of Marshal Ney's force on 6 September.⁵⁷ By the end of September Schwarzenberg decided that the Allies had enough numerical superiority to defeat Napoleon.




FIGURE 5

As Bennigson approached Schwarzenberg's control, the Austrian General decided that the Army of Bohemia should move once again to threaten Napoleon's lines of communications by moving to Baireuth by way of Hof.⁵⁸ He began this movement on 26 September to threaten Napoleon's southern flank. Additionally, as this was occurring Blucher would move to his right and join his forces with those of Crown Prince Charles north of Napoleon's main army. By 3

October, Blucher with 63,000 men had reached the convergence of the Elbe and Black River. While Blucher was crossing the Elbe River, Crown Prince Charles also crossed the Elbe near Rossau. The armies of the North and Silesia linked up north of Leipzig between the Mulde and Saale Rivers.⁵⁹

Upon discovering that the two armies had united, Napoleon changed his base of operations from Dresden back to the west toward Leipzig. He quit Dresden on 7 October and moved to the north intent on defeating Blucher and Crown Prince Charles. (See Figure 5.) He began by attacking into Taubitz, but was interrupted by reports of Schwarzenberg moving toward Leipzig where Murat was located with 40,000 men to defend the city. Napoleon arrived in Leipzig on 14 October. It would be at Leipzig that the Allies would muster the overwhelming superiority to decisively defeat Napoleon.⁶⁰

The decisive event of the 1813 campaign was the Battle of Leipzig, which occurred 16-19 October. The Allies were able to engage Napoleon with 365,000 men and 1,500 pieces of artillery, compared to his 195,000 men and 700 pieces of artillery.⁶¹ Alexander disagreed with the tactical disposition and insisted on retaining control of the Russian forces. He used this instance to rebuke Schwarzenberg stating, "Well Marshal, since you insist, you will do what you like with the Austrian Army, but as for the Russian troops of Grand Duke Constantine and Barclay, they will go to the right of the Pleisse where they ought to be and nowhere else!"⁶²

The Allies achieved a decisive victory pushing Napoleon's army back across the Elster River with tremendous losses. Over the four-day battle, Napoleon lost over 38,000 men and a further 30,000 captured. Additionally, the last of the Rhine Confederation allies defected to the Sixth Coalition as the Saxons moved over to the Allies during the battle.⁶³ Leipzig was the overwhelming battle envisioned in the Trachenburg Plan. Schwarzenberg had concentrate the "largest allied force" against the enemy's main army as stated in principle two of the plan. The Allies had "made the enemy camp the point of rendezvous" as stated in the Trachenburg Plan,⁶⁴ and that point was Leipzig.

While Field Marshal Schwarzenberg persevered to ensure the coalition succeeded at the operational level, it was Prince Metternich who set the conditions for success at the strategic level. In his role as Foreign Minister, Prince Metternich was the dominant player in the Austrian Imperial Government. His personality, as well as his convictions, dominated Austrian foreign policy relative to the Sixth Coalition. Prince Metternich was a firm believer in the concept of the God-given right of the dynastic families to rule their respective countries. He believed that the stability of Europe rested on the legitimacy of the traditional houses of Europe. For the survival

of the multi-ethnic, Hapsburg Empire, Metternich would make every effort to suppress the emergence of nationalism and other liberal ideas that were a threat to this stability. According to the ruling elite, which included the diplomats of the time, “like minded” rulers should make all the important decisions.⁶⁵ These ideals and resulting philosophy guided how Prince Metternich formulated Austria’s strategy during the campaign.

Flowing logically from this philosophy, Austria’s national interests were to maintain the power of the Hapsburg family on the throne and increase the territory of the Austrian Empire, which would enhance the power, influence, and prestige of the Austrian Empire.⁶⁶ These national objectives guided Metternich in his transactions with the other Great Powers in development of Austrian strategy. To accomplish these objectives, Metternich made several proposals to Prussia and Russia during the armistice negotiations prior to formally joining the coalition. The Austrian proposals included: dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, enlargement of Prussia from Poland and Danzig, restoration of the Illyrian province to Austria, independence of the Hanseatic cities in the Baltic with the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, and restoration of the western borders of Prussia to the pre-1806 positions.⁶⁷ Metternich understood that the other powers would not agree to the proposals but also understood they would buy time for Austria to prepare her army. Additionally, unlike Britain and Prussia, Metternich did not believe that Napoleon had to be removed from the French throne to meet Austria’s objectives. He was more concerned with the domination of either Prussia or Russia in the emerging struggle over the former states of the Confederation of the Rhine.

These proposals were incredibly demanding, and if achieved would clearly address the objectives of the Austrian Empire. Metternich was able to make these demands because he assessed that he had the means in the Austrian Army to achieve the goals of his nation, if he could stall using diplomacy long enough to prepare that Army. He linked the advantage the large Austro-Hungarian army gave him to the diplomatic tool of power. Playing the Coalition against Napoleon suited Austria’s needs until she was certain that her mediation could not obtain her objectives.

Austria played the neutrality game masterfully in 1813 exercising her diplomatic element of national power. She had offered to mediate the conflict between France and Russia in December 1812.⁶⁸ Napoleon rejected this offer of armed mediation. Once again, in March 1813 Metternich offered the “Good Offices” of the Austrian Government for a peace settlement, and the negotiations continued but without settlement. At this time, both Napoleon and Metternich were jockeying for diplomatic position. Napoleon believed that the Austrian Emperor was a coward and that his relation as his son in law would prevent open hostility. These beliefs

colored his negotiations with Metternich. Metternich was vying for time until the Austrian army would be ready for operations. On 29 April, Metternich formally assured the Allies that Austria would cooperate with the coalition.⁶⁹ He was playing both sides to the benefit of Austria. Metternich understood that Austria could deal from a position of strength that she had not enjoyed anytime during the Napoleonic Wars. Her ability to sway the balance of power with her large army was at an all time high. He just needed time to prepare the army and use it as an instrument to attain Austria's objectives.

The condition of Austria's army was a key element in Metternich's dealings with both the allies and Napoleon. While Austria's army was involved in the Russian expedition, it was not decisively engaged and came out of the campaign unscathed. Conversely, the campaign almost destroyed both the allied and French armies, and the new armies were in no way equals in quality and experience to the ones destroyed during 1812 and the first part of 1813. The Austrians currently had 250,000 soldiers in the field with the potential to arm another 75,000 in less than four weeks.⁷⁰ This allowed Metternich to negotiate from a position of strength. He even used this advantage to extend the summer armistice beyond the date when the Austrian army would finish its mobilization. He knew that both the Russo-Prussian alliance and France were vying for Austria's support. Metternich used this position of strength to ensure that an Austrian General held the dominant position in the coalition. This was the critical decision in the fall of 1813 that contributed to Austria accomplishing its strategic objectives through the use of the Sixth Coalition. US officers can expect to be in the same position in future coalitions.

THE ACCOUNTING

The Sixth Coalition floundered until the full integration of Austria into the operations. Austria contributed immense physical and conceptual resources to the coalition's victory. Her large army and the development and implementation of coalition strategy were paramount to the coalition's success. At the tactical and operational level, Napoleon was winning the campaign in 1813 as demonstrated by the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen. Austria's entry into the coalition reversed that trend once Austria's full resources were brought to bear.

While the Allies still lost the first major battle after the formal accession of Austria into the coalition, this was prior to the full integration of the resources of the Austrian Empire. Although the Sixth coalition still operated in a slow, cumbersome manner, its operations were much improved by the addition of Austria. Without the contribution of Austria as the dominant partner, there is no credible evidence to support the belief that Napoleon would not have continued to win major operationally significant battles and ultimately "wear down" the determination of the

coalition members. The Austrian resources were the decisive element tilting the balance of power in favor of the Sixth Coalition. When the Austrians formally joined the coalition, it was the first time in the Napoleonic wars that three major continental powers opposed Napoleon at the same time. The Coalition had such an advantage of resources that it could even afford minor mistakes and disagreements, as long as it maintained its focus on the defeat of Napoleon. Even the military genius of one of history's greatest captains could not overcome these tremendous odds indefinitely. The principle of attrition, as embodied in the Trachenburg Plan, proved to be an appropriate operational way to achieve the objective of overthrowing Napoleon given the means the Allies had at their disposal.

At the operational level, the Sixth Coalition did not develop a workable plan to execute their strategic objective of the overthrow of Napoleon until the inception of the Trachenburg Plan. Britain and Russia had been at war with the French through much of 1812, and Prussia joined the Coalition in February 1813. As late as May 1813 the Russian and Prussian leaders still had no definable plan to execute their strategy. The bickering over the concentration area is an example of this. Napoleon forced the Allies to react to his moves instead of implementing a well thought out plan to take the initiative to achieve the coalition objectives. Furthermore, following Lutzen, both Prussia and Russia allowed national concerns to govern the location of their forces after the retreat, instead of focusing on destroying Napoleon's army. This occurred again during the Battle of Bautzen as Czar Alexander intervened in both the tactical plan as well as the direction of the retreat. It was not until the development of the Trachenburg Plan, agreed upon on 12 July 1813, that the Allies had a workable, clearly defined operational plan. The primary credit for this plan rests with the Austrians, and once again illustrates the important role Austria played in the Coalition.

The Sixth Coalition included Britain, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, several Minor German states and Austria. Each of the major powers brought several strengths to the coalition that effectively contributed to the success of the partnership. However, they also brought their own national interests, and agendas, which conversely pulled the coalition apart. Nevertheless, the one uniting factor in cementing the coalition to a common cause was the threat Napoleon posed to each of the coalition members. Austria's senior leaders were able to maintain the focus of the coalition on defeating Napoleon. Despite the frustration of dissenting opinions and bickering from monarchs and other senior leaders, Prince Metternich and Schwarzenberg were able to keep the coalition together. While Schwarzenberg was never able to achieve unity of command he was able to maintain unity of effort. US leaders will likely be faced with the same challenges in the future. As our national leaders form coalitions, these coalitions will include

nations whose policy goals are not one hundred percent in line with our nation's goals. Maintaining unity of effort in these circumstances will ensure success despite the intricacies of the command structure.

Because of the preeminence of the United States in the international community, US military leaders will most likely operate as the senior leader in any major operation the US undertakes in the near future. We will not participate in major operations providing the majority of forces without maintaining the preponderance of authority within the partnership. Because of contending objectives and often-disparate interests of coalition partners, coalitions are routinely faced with immense tensions. These tensions tend to pull the coalition apart as the threat they face lessens and partners pursue their own national interests at the cost of coalition objectives. Conversely, coalition partners tend to come together when the threat reemerges or gains the advantage. US leaders, as representatives of the senior partner, need to understand this dynamic and prepare themselves to operate in this complex environment. They also need to keep in mind as the senior coalition partner US leaders are expected to maintain unity of effort within the coalition while keeping the focus on the coalition objectives in order to support US interests.

Word Count 8352.

ENDNOTES

¹ Clyde M. Leavelle, An Analysis in Coalition Warfare: Napoleon's Defeat at the Battle of Nations-Leipzig, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 14 July 1998), 29 and 47.

² President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: The White House, September 2002), Throughout the document the President repeatedly mentions the importance of working with allies and friends to address regional instability.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 Joint: Doctrine for Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 April 2000), 1-3.

⁴ Joint Publication 3-16, I-9 to I-10.

⁵ At his time, the coalition consisted of Russia, Britain, Spain, and Portugal.

⁶ George F. Nafziger, Lutzen and Bautzen; Napoleon's Spring Campaign of 1813 (Chicago, Il.: Emperor's Press, 1992), 61.

⁷ The situation within the Confederation of the Rhine was clearly anti-French and anti-Napoleon but due to the positioning of the French Army the loyalty of the various elements was uncertain. Reports from Wurzburg, The Grand Duchy of Frankfort, Wurttemberg, Cleve-Burg, Westphalia, Saxony and Bavaria all indicated popular support for the Allies. An example of the problems Napoleon faced include the surrender of a Battalion from the Saxon duchies that surrendered to a detachment of 20 Prussian Hussars in April, while the Duchy of Mecklenburg declared for the Allies in March. Nafziger, Lutzen and Bautzen, 102-103 .

⁸ Jonathon P. Riley, Napoleon and the World War of 1813 (Bodmin, Cornwall: MPG Books LTD., 2000), 74.

⁹ Riley 74.

¹⁰ Count York Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General (Worseley Series, 1955), 241.

¹¹ Count York Wartenburg, Atlas to Accompany Napoleon as a General (Worseley Series, 1955), 96.

¹² Nafziger, 114 and 122.

¹³ Petre. 58.

¹⁴ Nafziger, Lutzen and Bautzen 115.

¹⁵ F. N. Maude, The Leipzig Campaign 1813 (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., LIM, 1908), 101.

¹⁶ Petre, 60.

- ¹⁷ Petre, 61.
- ¹⁸ Riley, 76.
- ¹⁹ Warttenburg, Atlas to Accompany Napoleon as a General, Map 96.
- ²⁰ David G. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon (New York N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1966), 887.
- ²¹ Nafziger, Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon's Spring Campaign of 1813, 191.
- ²² David Hamilton-Williams, The Fall of Napoleon: The Final Betrayal (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1994), 31.
- ²³ Riley, 96.
- ²⁴ Nafziger, Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon's Spring Campaign of 1813, 201.
- ²⁵ Riley, 93.
- ²⁶ Hamilton-Williams, The Fall of Napoleon: The Final Betrayal, 31.
- ²⁷ Scott Bowden, Napoleon's Grand Armee of 1813 (Chicago, Il.: Emperor's Press, 1990), 96.
- ²⁸ Riley, 97.
- ²⁹ Riley 97.
- ³⁰ R.F. Delderfield, Imperial Sunset: The Fall of Napoleon 1813-1814 (New York N.Y.: Stein and Day Publishers, 1968), 62-63.
- ³¹ Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822 (New York, N.Y.: The Murrey Printing Co., 1961), 34.
- ³² Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 897.
- ³³ Riley 109.
- ³⁴ Allan Palmer, Metternich: Councillor of Europe (London,: Orion Books, 1972), 103.
- ³⁵ Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 900.
- ³⁶ Gordon Craig, The Harmon Memorial Lectures on Military History, Harry R. Browski "Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance Against Napoleon 1813-1814" (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History United States Air Force, 1988), 326. Exact numbers for this campaign differ like many sources in history. Alan Palmer in Metternich: Councillor of Europe, cites the Allies with 800,000 and Napoleon with 700,000 counting his

unreliable allies, 104. However, every source agrees that the Sixth Coalition substantially outnumbered Napoleon after the assessment of Austria into the coalition.

³⁷ Delderfield, 88.

³⁸ Digby Smith, 1813 Leipzig: Napoleon and the Battle of Nations (London: Greenhill Books, 2001), 14.

³⁹ This interpretation apparently began in Col F.N. Muade's work, The Leipzig Campaign 1813. It is repeated in George Nafziger's book Napoleon at Dresden. (Chicago, IL: Emperor's Press, 1994), 12. as well as David Chandler's, Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars, 448.

⁴⁰ Hamilton-Williams, The Fall of Napoleon: The Final Betrayal, 37.

⁴¹ Gordon Craig, The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History 1959-1987, 328.

⁴² Gordon Craig, 328.

⁴³ Antony Brett-James, Europe Against Napoleon (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), 80.

⁴⁴ Gordon Craig, 330.

⁴⁵ Wartenburg, Atlas To Accompany Napoleon as a General, map 100.

⁴⁶ Riley, 123-124.

⁴⁷ Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 904-908.

⁴⁸ Palmer, Metternich: Councillor of Europe, 104.

⁴⁹ Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 911.

⁵⁰ Hamilton Williams, 40.

⁵¹ Riley, 145-146.

⁵² Philip J. Haythornthwaite, Napoleon's Military Machine (New York, N.Y.: Hippocrene Books, 1988), 146.

⁵³ Maude, 206.

⁵⁴ Lawford, Napoleon The Last Campaigns 1813-1815 (New York, N.Y.: Crown Publishers Inc., 1979), 53

⁵⁵ Lawford, 53.

⁵⁶ Lawford 53.

⁵⁷ Wartenberg, Atlas, Map 107b.

⁵⁸ Petre, 292-293.

⁵⁹ Lawford, 53-54.

⁶⁰ Lawford, 54.

⁶¹ Philip J. Haythornthwaite, Napoleon's Military Machine, 146.

⁶² Troyat, Alexander of Russia: Napoleon's Conqueror, 174.

⁶³ Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 936.

⁶⁴ Charles William Vane Stewart, Marquess of Londonberry, Narrative of the War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814 (London: Henry Colburn & Richard Bently, 1830), 372-373. See Figure 4 for the translated text of the Trachenburg Plan from LCDR Kuehn's The Reason's for the Success of the Sixth Coaliton Against Napoleon in 1813.

⁶⁵ Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 104.

⁶⁶ Delderfield, Imperial Sunset: The Fall of Napoleon 1813-1814, 37.

⁶⁷ Delderfield, Imperial Sunset. The Fall of Napoleon 1813-1814, 71

⁶⁸ Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, 42.

⁶⁹ Nafziger, Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon's Spring Campaign of 1813, 103.

⁷⁰ Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, 45.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alsup, Susan Mary. The Congress Dances. New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row Publishers, 1984.
- Bowden, Scott Napoleon's Grand Arme'e of 1813. Chicago, Il.: The Emperor's Press, 1990.
- Brett-James, Antony. Europe Against Napoleon: The Leipzig Campaign 1813 London: Macmillan St. Martin's Press, 1970.
- Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1966.
- Chilicoat, Richard A. "Course Overview." Core Curriculum Course 2: "War National Security Policy and Strategy", John F. Troxell, Course Director, Carlisle Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2002.
- Craig, Gordon A. "Problems in Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance Against Napoleon 1813-1814." In The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987, ed. Harry R. Borowski, 325-346. Washington DC.: Office of Air Force History United States Air Force, 1988.
- Delderfield, R. F. Imperial Sunset. New York, N.Y.: Stein and Day Publishers, 1968.
- Haythornthwaite, Philip J. Napoleon's Military Machine. New York, N.Y.: Hippocrene Books, 1988.
- _____. The Napoleonic Source Book. New York, N.Y.: Facts on File, 1990.
- Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1994.
- Kuehn, John Trost. The Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition Against Napoleon in 1813, Command and General Staff College Thesis. Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: 1997.
- Lawford, James. Napoleon The Last Campaigns 1813-1815. New York, N.Y.: Crown Publishers Inc., 1979.
- Leavelle, Clyde M. An Analysis in Coalition Warfare: Napoleon's Defeat at the Battle of Nations-Leipzig. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 14 July 1998.
- Maude, F.N. The Campaign of 1813. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1908.
- Nafziger, George, Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon's Spring Campaign of 1813 Chicago, Il.: The Emperor's Press, 1992.
- _____. Napoleon at Dresden. Chicago, Il.: The Emperor's Press, 1994.
- Nicolson, Harold. The Congress of Vienna/ A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822 New York, N.Y.: The Viking Press, 1961.
- Palmer, Alan. Metternich: The Councillor of Europe. London: Orion Books Ltd., 1972.

Riley, Jonathon. P. Napoleon and the World War of 1813 Bodmin Cornwall, . MPG Books Ltd.: 2000.

Smith, Digby, 1813 Liepzig: Napoleon and the Battle of Nations, London: Greenhill Books, 2001.

Stewart, Charles William Vane, Marquess of Londonberry, Narrative of the War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814. London: Henry Colburn & Richard Bently, 1830.

Troyat, Henri, Alexander of Russia: Napoleon's Conqueror. New York: E. P. Dutton, INC., 1980.

Wartenburg, Count York V. Napoleon as a General, 2 Volumes Worseley Series, 1955.

_____. Atlas to Accompany Napoleon as a General, Worseley Series, 1955.

Williams, David-Hamilton. The Fall of Napoleon. New York, NY.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1994.

U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-16. Washington D.C.: 5 April 2000.